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Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms: Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Write via Google Drive Filename Path Traversal

CVE-2026-120522Published Wordfence advisory

Action summary

Affected ≤1.2.0Update to 1.2.5 or newer

All remediation steps

400+ active installs

Watch plugin
Severity
Critical9.8CVSS 3.1
Access
No account needed
Exploitation
Not in CISA KEVEPSS n/a
VulnCrest
Source and patch review

Summary

A critical path traversal flaw in the Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms plugin lets an unauthenticated attacker write files outside the plugin's intended downloads directory. The write path derives the filename from a Google Drive metadata value that the attacker controls, and the endpoint that stores the attacker's Google Drive credentials requires no authentication, so the issue can be reached without any login.

When a written file with a PHP extension is placed in a web-accessible location, remote code execution occurs. All versions up to and including 1.2.0 are affected; version 1.2.5 fixed it.

Are you affected?

  • Your site is affected if the Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms plugin is installed in any version up to and including 1.2.0.
  • Your site is affected regardless of whether any Cloud Storage Manager features appear to be in active use, because the vulnerable REST endpoints are registered by the plugin.
  • Your site is not affected by this specific flaw if the plugin is at version 1.2.5 or newer.

Not sure which version you run? Run a passive check. It reads public files only.

Source description (Wordfence Intelligence), credited to Adam Rayyan Aryasatya

The Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms – Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, S3 Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.0. This is due to missing authorization checks on the `connection/{driver}/save` and `/download/single-file` REST endpoints, combined with insufficient path validation in the Google Drive `downloadFile()` function, where the Google Drive metadata `name` value is concatenated into a local path without `basename()`, `sanitize_file_name()`, or canonical path validation. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to store attacker-controlled Google Drive credentials, trigger a download of an attacker-owned file whose provider-returned filename contains path traversal, and write attacker-controlled content outside the intended `downloads` directory. When the written file has a PHP extension and lands in a web-accessible location, this can lead to remote code execution.

What to do

  1. Update the Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms plugin to version 1.2.5 or a newer patched release.
  2. If you cannot update immediately, deactivate the plugin until a patched version is installed.
  3. After updating, review the site's file system, especially web-accessible directories, for unexpected PHP files written by the plugin's downloads path.
  4. If the site ran an affected version while publicly reachable, rotate administrator passwords and the secret keys in wp-config.php.

Technical analysis

Two REST endpoints, connection/{driver}/save and /download/single-file, are exposed without authorization checks. The Google Drive downloadFile() function takes the Google Drive metadata name value and concatenates it directly into a local path, with no call to basename(), sanitize_file_name(), or any canonical path validation before the provider-supplied filename is used.

The fix

Version 1.2.5 is the patched release. It added fwcsm_admin_route_policy() in helpers.php, which wraps current_user_can('manage_options') for the plugin's REST routes and enforces the wp_rest nonce for CSRF protection. downloadSingleFile() now resolves the download target from the trusted fwcsm_uploads ledger using mediaKey, id, or the legacy url as a lookup key only, rather than fetching a client-supplied URL, closing the SSRF path. A new resolveLedgerTarget() helper derives the provider locator from the ledger row; for Google Drive the file id is extracted with basename() from gdrive://<fileId> and file_path is used via basename() as the file name. Client-supplied download names are passed through sanitize_file_name(), and a new sanitizeZipPath() helper sanitizes ZIP entry folder segments and strips . and .. segments to guard against zip-slip. A new UploadErrorsController::index() route requires current_user_can('manage_options') and returns 403 otherwise.

How this was established

Based on review of the advisory, the source code and the patch. Not reproduced end-to-end in a lab.

VulnCrest does not publish working exploit code. This analysis passed automated source and consistency checks; it was not individually reviewed by a researcher.

Record details

Advisory ID
CVE-2026-120522
Advisory title
Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms <= 1.2.0 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Write via Google Drive Filename Path Traversal
Affected
≤1.2.0
Fixed in
1.2.5
Required access
No account needed
Credit
Adam Rayyan Aryasatya
  1. Affected≤ 1.2.0
  2. Patched in1.2.5
  3. Latest1.2.9

Update to 1.2.5 or newer.

9.8
CVSS 3.1 · CNA (Wordfence)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
What does this vector mean?
AV:N Attack vector
Network
AC:L Attack complexity
Low
PR:N Privileges required
None
UI:N User interaction
None
S:U Scope
Unchanged
C:H Confidentiality
High
I:H Integrity
High
A:H Availability
High

NVD scores this 9.8 (NVD).

References & provenance

Proof-of-concept & detection

No public proof-of-concept or detection template is known for this vulnerability.

Advisories & patches

Timeline

  1. CVE published

    Severity critical, CVSS 9.8

  2. Record last updated

  3. VulnCrest analysis published

Sources & licenses

Sources & licenses

Wordfence record
Vulnerability data
Wordfence Intelligence. Copyright 2012-2026 Defiant Inc. Licensed under the CC BY-SA 4.0.
CVE® identifiers
Copyright 1999-2026 The MITRE Corporation. Used under the CVE Program. CVE® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.
CVSS / CWE
National Vulnerability Database (NVD), shown unmodified. This product uses the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
VulnCrest content
Analysis, summary, remediation and page layout © VulnCrest. Not sourced from NVD.

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