Appointment Booking Plugin <= 5.7.6 — Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via Account Takeover via 'IS NOT NULL' Sentinel in 'password_reset_token' Parameter

Am I affected?

• Check your version: in wp-admin go to Plugins → Installed Plugins and read the version under Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar & Scheduling for WordPress.
• No admin access? Run a passive check of your site. It reads public files only.
• No account is needed to exploit this. Treat any exposed site on an affected version as at risk.

What to do

1. Update to version 5.7.7, or a newer patched version
2. Rotate administrator passwords and application secrets if the site ran a vulnerable version while publicly reachable.
3. Watch Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar & Scheduling for WordPress to get an email when the next vulnerability is published.

Advisory

Source description from Wordfence Intelligence, credited to Jakub Herman.

The Appointment Booking Plugin – LatePoint | Calendar & Scheduling for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.7.6. This is due to the `OsModel::build_conditions_query()` function in `lib/models/model.php` comparing WHERE-clause values against the literal strings `'IS NULL'` and `'IS NOT NULL'` and concatenating a match directly into SQL without binding it as a parameter, a flaw that neither `sanitize_text_field()` nor the 5.7.5 `is_scalar()` hardening guard closes, since both pass the scalar sentinel through unchanged. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to send `params[password_reset_token]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `customer_cabinet__change_password` AJAX route to match every non-null `account_nonse` value, resolving to the lowest-id customer and overwriting that customer's password to an attacker-chosen value — granting full access to their bookings, orders, and PII, and, when the `wp_users_as_customers` option is enabled, takeover of the linked WordPress subscriber or customer-role account. The attacker can first identify the target customer's email by sending `params[order_intent_key]=IS NOT NULL` to the public `steps__start_from_order_intent` route, which returns the name and email from the first matching order intent, and can then self-arm the required 15-minute password-reset freshness window by triggering a reset for that customer directly.

Exploits & references

Proof-of-concept & detection

No public proof-of-concept or detection template is known for this vulnerability.

Advisories & patches

• Advisorywordfence.com

Related CVEs

Timeline

1. Nov 6, 2026

   CVE published

   Severity critical, CVSS 9.1

2. Nov 13, 2026

   Record last updated