Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce <= 2.1.0 — Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass to Account Takeover via Abandoned Password Reset Finalization

Am I affected?

• Check your version: in wp-admin go to Plugins → Installed Plugins and read the version under Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce.
• No admin access? Run a passive check of your site. It reads public files only.
• No account is needed to exploit this. Treat any exposed site on an affected version as at risk.

What to do

1. Update to version 2.1.1, or a newer patched version
2. Rotate administrator passwords and application secrets if the site ran a vulnerable version while publicly reachable.
3. Watch Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce to get an email when the next vulnerability is published.

Advisory

Source description from Wordfence Intelligence, credited to Tin Nguyen Huu.

The Naimur Email OTP Verification for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions up to, and including, 2.1.0. This is due to the plugin's password-reset finalization endpoint (the wp_ajax_nopriv_ceovw_update_new_password action handled by CEOVW_AJAX::update_new_password()) authorizing the reset solely by the presence of a database row marking an email as 'VERIFIED', with no timestamp check, no session binding, and no per-reset token — combined with mark_otp_as_verified_for_reset() leaving the row in that state after a user enters their code (abandoning the flow leaves the row behind), and a scheduled 'ceovw_cleanup_expired_otps_event' cron that has no add_action() handler anywhere in the plugin so cleanup never runs. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to take over any account whose owner previously requested and verified a password-reset code and did not immediately finish choosing a new password — the attacker needs only the victim's email address and a nonce that the plugin itself localizes publicly into the CEOVW_APP global on the WooCommerce account page for logged-out visitors, after which they call the endpoint, overwrite the victim's password, and are returned a live wordpress_logged_in_ session cookie for that user (full site takeover if the account is an administrator).

Exploits & references

Proof-of-concept & detection

No public proof-of-concept or detection template is known for this vulnerability.

Advisories & patches

• Advisorywordfence.com

Timeline

1. Nov 6, 2026

   CVE published

   Severity critical, CVSS 9.8

2. Nov 13, 2026

   Record last updated